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INTRODUCTION
To many, the Duty of Confidentiality of Banks (commonly
called Bank secrecy) is controversial. Because banking activi-
ties affect practically everyone, it is hard to ignore the confiden-
tiality issue. Indeed, the laws of almost every country address
it in some manner. From the United States to Great Britain,
from Antigua to Hong Kong, from Bahrain to Singapore and
from Liechtenstein to (of course) Switzerland, one finds some
form of regulation dealing with banking secrets.'
Switzerland has developed a system to protect Bank se-
crecy unrivaled in the world, one that has endured over time.
No other country has shown such strong attachment to a princi-
ple that has enjoyed little public sympathy but strong private
support. Holding fast to the notion of protection of privacy,
Switzerland has built an efficient and competitive Banking sys-
tem second to none.2 Since the enactment of the Federal Bank-
ing Law of Switzerland, and particularly in recent years, Bank
secrecy has been subject to critique and attack in connection
with certain well-publicized abuses. 3 On some occasions even
1 For an overview, country by country, of the legislation on bank secrecy see
DENNIS CAMPBELL, INTERNATIONAL BANK SECRECY (1992).
2 Schweizerische Bankiervereinigung, DAS SCHWEIZERISCHE BANKGEHEIMNIS
3 (1985).
3 As recently as Spring 1994, the Duty of Confidentiality of Swiss Banks was
debated in connection with the bank accounts held in Switzerland by Aldrich
Ames, the CIA officer who provided information to the Russian KGB. See for a
brief discussion of the Ames case, Tim Weiner, Why I Spy: Aldrich Ames, N.Y.
TIMES, July 31, 1994, § 6 (Magazine), at 16.
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criminal activities have benefitted from the protection that the
system offers. Nevertheless, to dismiss the Duty of Confidenti-
ality of Banks, on the basis of those few cases,4 is as unthink-
able as abolishing the Miranda rights simply because their
abuse has been instrumental in the release of several
murderers.
The purpose of this article is to present the basic principles
of Swiss Bank secrecy and to analyze the recent developments
of a legal notion that is identified with the Swiss Banking sys-
tem. The Duty of Confidentiality of Banks does not consist of a
static and rigid principle; on the contrary, this notion is subject
to developments in areas like criminal law, tax law, trust and
wills, and generally the whole civil law structure.5 As we will
see in the course of this article, the Duty of Confidentiality of
Banks has been designed to protect the interests of natural, as
well as legal, persons.6 The principle of the protection of per-
sonality plays a very important role in the definition of Bank
secrecy since it may be limited only by needs related to public
law and order. Principles which dominate criminal law and
criminal procedure, as well as international judicial assistance,
also contribute in defining the limits of the Duty of Confidenti-
ality of Banks but at the same time enhance its significance.
What we have tried to achieve in the following pages is an
examination of the Duty of Confidentiality of Banks through the
eyes of practitioners, in order to better understand this institu-
tion of Swiss law.7 Our study integrates the findings and devel-
4 See for example, the critiques and debates related to the handling of the
Marcos matter. In this case involving the former president of the Philippines, the
late Ferdinand Marcos, Swiss Banks were criticized because assets deposited on
Marcos' bank accounts were blocked even before the official intervention of the
Swiss authorities. In order to avoid the challenge that funds notoriously under
dispute could be withdrawn from Marcos' bank accounts, Swiss Banks acted uni-
laterally, independently and based solely upon their internal diligence mechanism
which was triggered by the intervention of the Federal Banking Commission; Du-
NANT & WASSMER, Swiss BANK SECRECY: ITS LImITs UNDER Swiss AND INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW, 20 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 541, 564 (1988).
5 Hanspeter Dietzi, Schweizerischer Bankverein, DER MONAT, Nov. 1990, at
32.
6 AUBERT ET AL., DAS SCHWEIZERISCHE BANKGEHEIMNIS 29 (1978).
7 The mystique created around the notion of bank secrecy in Switzerland has
often confused the perception of its essence among lawyers and business operators.
Recent controversies, together with negative publicity from foreign public entities
interested in looking into private assets deposited in Swiss Banks, have further
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opments related to the prosecution by Italian authorities
against the corruption that has dominated politics in that coun-
try during recent times.8 The authorities of both Italy and
Switzerland have cooperated in the attempt to bring corrupt
politicians to justice, and have sought access to Banking records
of an extensive number of individuals. Thus, Swiss courts have
been called to clarify, and to some extent reinforce, the Duty of
Confidentiality of Banks in connection with the commitments to
the international mutual assistance treaties.
I. THE, NOTION OF DuTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY OF BANKS
Bank secrecy can be defined as the obligation of a financial
institution, and of its officers and employees, to protect and
withhold information acquired while handling a client's busi-
ness.9 In addition to the bank itself, in Switzerland, the obliga-
tion extends to every individual who, in the performance of his
or her professional activities, acquires information related to
the business of a client.10
created insecurity and confusion as to the real significance of the principle of confi-
dentiality. Often we had the opportunity to encounter wrong evaluations of what
the Swiss Banking system stands for. In other circumstances, it was suggested to
us that the Duty of Confidentiality of Banks in Switzerland was no longer the law
of the land. Among others, our intent is to clarify some of the doubts around the
notion of bank secrecy and to show, for better or worse, it solidly survives the at-
tacks of its detractors.
8 The so called "Mani Pulite" (Unclean Hands) inquiry has shaken the Ital-
ian political establishment at all levels. As a consequence, Italy has had a radical
change in the composition of its national and regional governments, parliament,
and administrative institutions. The level of corruption based on kickbacks for
public contracts was so institutionalized that it reached and affected the ability to
do business at all levels. For an example of how deep the problem had gone, see a
description of how it affected the fashion industry in Sara Gay Forden, 'Clean
Hands' put squeeze on Milanese; corruption investigation in Milan, Italy, code-
named 'operation clean hands', WOMEN[S] WEAR DAILY, Mar. 8, 1993, at 1. Far
from being resolved or put to rest, the problem of corruption under past govern-
ments keeps affecting the Italian political life. See Oliver Baube, Berlusconi gears
up for quizzing by corruption judges, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, INTERNATIONAL
NEws, Dec. 12, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, CUR File.
9 Bank secrecy is also defined as "[t]he obligation of the bank and its employ-
ees to keep secret information referring to its customers." See generally, UBS Dic-
TIONARY OF BANKING AND FINANCE Pus. No. 66 (1984).
10 Among the individuals subject to the Duty of Confidentiality are internal,
as well as external, auditors and professionals performing services involving the
business of the bank. See art. 41 FEDERAL BANKING LAW OF SwrrzERLAND (1972)
[hereinafter "FEDERAL BANKING LAw"].
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In Switzerland, Article 1 of the Federal Banking Law in-
cludes under the definition of "Bank" other financial enterprises
that solicit the deposit of money." Under Swiss law, persons
acting for or on behalf of banks are directly responsible to safe-
guard the client's secrets (banks, financial institutions and their
employees are hereafter referred to as "Banks").12 In this re-
gard, the protection of Bank secrecy requires the following ele-
ments: (i) a Bank or other financial institution as defined by
applicable law; (ii) an individual or legal entity that enters into
a legal relationship with the Bank to obtain its services ("Cli-
ent");1 3 (iii) any information concerning the business or per-
sonal affairs of the Client which the Bank has acquired in
performing services to the Client (the "Information"); 14 and (iv)
an obligation under applicable law for Banks to protect the In-
formation relating to their Clients, and the prosecution of dis-
closures in violation of such law.1 As discussed below,16 under
Swiss law such obligation is set forth, interpreted and enforced
under three separate legislative acts.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The Duty of Confidentiality of Banks is as old as Banking
institutions themselves. The Articles of Association and the By-
Laws of many older western Banks provided for the observance
of strict confidentiality in their dealings with Clients. In fact,
the notion of confidentiality in financial matters was already
contemplated in the commercial codes of Germany and North-
ern Italy in the Middle Ages.' 7 As commerce expanded, the
need of trustworthy Bankers increased and the performance of
Banking services based on discretion and confidentiality was
the private individual's only protection against the feudal au-
thority.18 Clearly, the Duty of Confidentiality of Banks is not a
11 Article 1.2 of the FEDERAL BANKING LAw lists in detail all other entities
which are to be considered banks for purposes of the application of the law.
12 AUBERT ET AL., supra note 6, at 64.
13 MARTiN LUSCHER, DAS SCHWEIZERISCHE BANKGEHEIMNIS IN
STRAFRECHTLICHEN SicHT 34-36 (1972).
14 AUBERT ET AL., supra note 6, at 29.
15 Article 47 of the FEDERAL BANKING LAw, infra note 43.
16 See infra section III.
17 See Le secret bancaire en suisse: legende et veritO Zurich, HANDELSBANK
N.W. (1976).
18 Supra note 2, at 3-9.
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creation of modern times nor does it represent a discovery of the
Swiss Banking system.19
Even before the adoption in 1934 of the Federal Banking
Law, Swiss Banks were required to preserve their Clients' pri-
vacy and prohibited from disclosing Information acquired in
servicing such Clients. Protection was limited, however, to the
privacy contemplated by the Civil Code and the laws regulating
contracts in the Commercial Code. In essence, remedies were
available only if a Client could bring legal action against the
Bank, and it was impossible to hold individual employees
responsible. 20
In preparing to enact the Federal Banking Law, Swiss au-
thorities strove to develop a set of rules to support the integrity
of the Banking system. The creation of a legal basis to maintain
the credibility of Bank secrecy was of extreme importance to the
Swiss political authorities in the late 1920's. Of particular con-
cern were espionage activities carried on in Switzerland by Ger-
many in an effort to stop fiscal evasion. Nazi Germany had also
begun the persecution of Jews by attempting to deprive them of
financial resources.21 Indeed, guaranteeing Bank secrecy repre-
sented the reaffirmation of both Swiss sovereignty and the indi-
vidual's right of privacy.22
In 1934 Switzerland adopted the Federal Banking Law,
which introduced a new criminal standard to protect Bank se-
crecy.23 The new law set forth, in addition to the usual fines,
jail terms for individuals violating Bank secrecy. Unlike the
disclosure of other professional secrets, for example by an attor-
ney, the disclosure of Bank secrets was made punishable even
without a specific complaint by the victim. By making it a state
crime, the political authorities reaffirmed the Duty of Confiden-
19 See Tim Salmine, Banking Secrecy Legislation in Western Europe, The
World of Banking, (Sept.-Oct. 1988).
20 Elliot A. Stultz, Swiss Bank Secrecy and United States Efforts to Obtain
Information from Swiss Banks, 21 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 63, 67 (1988).
21 Supra note 2, at 3.
22 The adoption of the criminal penalties for violation of the Duty of Confiden-
tiality in art. 47 of the FEDERAL BANKING LAW is also to be seen as a concession to
the demands for decentralization, federalism and protection against interferences
of the central government; JoHN R. LADEMANN, DAS SCHWEIZERISCHE
BANKGEHEIMNIS 158 (1984).
2 See infra note 43.
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tiality of Banks as a principle benefitting not only private but
public interests as well.
Since the adoption of the Federal Banking Law, Bank se-
crecy has helped protect, among others, the assets of individu-
als subject to political persecution. The first group to benefit
from the rules of 1934 were Jews persecuted by the Nazis in
Germany. It is no secret that Swiss Banks helped shield the
assets of a great number of Jewish fugitives during those tragic
years. 24 Indeed, attempts are often made to find assets of indi-
viduals persecuted for political or ethnic reasons.25 These and
other experiences, together with a deep respect for personal pri-
vacy and the understanding that a credible Banking system
was crucial to the survival of Switzerland as an independent
state, helped the country withstand many public attacks in re-
cent years.26 Individual scandals during the 1970's and 1980's
generated fierce criticisms from abroad and some attempts to
dismantle the legal structure protecting the Duty of Confidenti-
ality of Banks. 27 Despite such attacks, and thanks to the fact
that abuses of Bank secrecy are only a small, insignificant com-
ponent of the Banking activities, the system has grown into a
symbol of the Swiss Banking industry; Indeed, Switzerland
looks towards the year 2000 with no intention of changing a no-
tion that has proven sound for over half a century. Respect of
the Client's secrets is such an intimate part of the Swiss Bank-
ing system that to dismantle it would require the reeducation of
an entire country.28
III. TuE LEGAL BAsis FOR BANK SECRECY
In Switzerland, the obligation of Banks and Bankers to
maintain in confidence Information relating to the business
24 1 Foglio federale 1161 (1970).
25 ROGER SCHINDELHOLZ, Licencie es Sciences commerciales et economiques, Le
secret bancaire 2 (1969).
26 Strong criticism has been raised by the Socialist Party and other leftist or-
ganizations echoing the opinions of foreign judicial authorities; see Probleme Mit
Mythen, DER BUND, Apr. 23, 1991.
27 See JEAN ZIEGLER, La suisse lave plus blanc 16 (1990).
28 The last attempt to weaken the Duty of Confidentiality of Banks occurred
in the field of tax. This was in connection with the international assistance in
criminal matters which was rejected by a 3 to 1 ratio in a general vote held in
Switzerland in 1984.
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of Clients is found in three legislative acts, which will be dis-
cussed in detail below: the Civil Code, the Commercial Code
and the Federal Banking Law. Each complements the other
and sets forth a particular consequence: criminal, civil or
administrative.
A. Civil Code
The Civil Code provides for a Duty of Confidentiality of
Banks in general terms. The protection of Banking secrets is
not directly mentioned, but is derived from the interpretation of
Article 28.29 Article 28 sets forth a general obligation not to in-
terfere with the private life of others. As interpreted by the
Swiss Supreme Court, the right to privacy includes, among
others,30 all Information related to the private life of an individ-
ual,31 which includes financial Information.32 The obligation to
avoid interference is particularly important for those who ac-
quire personal Information about others in the performance of
their professional activities. Legal entities are also protected
under Article 28 of the Civil Code,33 subject only to the excep-
tions in § 2 of Article 28.3 4
Banks' obligations to their Clients under Article 28 are
based on the type of Information acquired and the nature of the
relationship with the Client. Typically, the professional rela-
tion between Banks and Clients puts the Bank in possession of
Information that would otherwise not be disseminated by the
Client. Information related to the economic affairs of a person
29 Article 28 provides under § 1 that "[w]hoever is illegally deprived of his
right to privacy may obtain the intervention of a judge against whoever participate
in the offense." § 2 states: "The offense is illegal whenever it is not justified by the
consent of the victim, by a prevailing public or private interest, or by the law."
30 Every democratic state incorporates the right to privacy in the constitution
as one element of personal freedom; BGE 89 1 98 and BGE 90 1 34.
31 The relations between the Bank and the Client are considered part of the
private domain protected by law as an element necessary to maintain personal
freedom; BGE 95 1 439.
52 Thus, under Swiss law the notion of personal privacy is broader than the
U.S. common law concept of right to privacy, which extends only to such areas
specifically designated as fundamental by the U.S. Supreme Court; see Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
a3 DTF 108 11241.
34 See supra note 29, § 2.
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are always deemed private. 35 In fact, the Swiss system as-
sumes that Bankers receive the same level of trust from their
Clients as do clerics.
The Civil Code protection of the Client's interests is set
forth under § 1 of Article 28(a). Pursuant to this provision, if a
violation of confidential Information is expected or threatened,
the Client can ask a judge to bar the Bank from releasing the
Information. In addition, as explained below,36 Article 27 of the
Civil Code offers the Client the option of suing the Bank for
damages under Articles 41 and 49 of the Commercial Code. 37
B. Commercial Code
Although the Commercial Code does not directly mention
the Duty of Confidentiality of Banks, it provides the legal basis
for Banks' obligation to maintain Clients' secrets in its provi-
sions pertaining to contracts. The Duty of Confidentiality of
Banks thus derives from the contractual relationship between
the Bank and the Client: the mandate. 38 This type of contract
is regulated in Articles 394 to 406 of the Commercial Code gov-
erning an agent's undertaking to provide services or carry out
business transactions on behalf of a principal. 39 The Duty of
Confidentiality in connection with this legal relation is derived
from the combination of Articles 394 and 398.40
35 In Switzerland, all Information concerning the Client-Bank relationship is
deemed to be private and to be protected as such, but also qualifies as reserved. As
the term indicates, reserved Information are intended for disclosure only and ex-
clusively to the individual who has received them in the first place; See ANDREAS
BUCHER, Personnes physiques et protection de la personnalit6 127-128 (1985).
36 For a specific discussion, see infra section V, part B.
37 Articles 41 to 61 of the Commercial Code ("Liability For Illegal Acts") pro-
vide for a legal ground to construct liability for damages caused in a non-contrac-
tual relation. In some situations it is possible that a cause of action arises
simultaneously out of a contract and out of an illegal act covered under said provi-
sions of the Commercial Code. The choice of the cause of action in such cases de-
pends mostly on litigation tactics and requirements related to the rules of
evidence. 1 K OFmINGER, Schweizerisches Haftpflichtrecht, ALLGEMEINER TEIL 482
(4th ed. 1975).
38 BGE 100 II 153.
39 For a discussion of the mandate see DANIEL GUGGENHEIM, DIE VERTRAGE
DER SCHWEIZERISCHEN BANKPaRis (1985).
40 Article 394, § 1, states: "[by accepting a mandate, the agent is obligated to
carry out the contractually agreed business transactions or services with which he
has been entrusted." The obligation of the Bank to maintain discretion in han-
dling the Client's business is implied by § 2 of art. 398 which provides that "[[tihe
[Vol. 7:329
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Typically, the Bank provides the Client with two types of
services: financial advice and Banking transactions. To obtain
such services the Client must provide the Bank with specific,
personal non-public Information. The duty of care and the obli-
gation of faithful execution of services set forth in § 2 of Article
398 create the legal basis for the Duty of Confidentiality of
Banks. Dissemination of Information relating to the Client and
acquired in connection with the performance of Banking serv-
ices violates Article 398. Under the Commercial Code, breach of
the mandate contract gives the principal the right of termina-
tion, as well as the right to compensation for damages.41
Clearly, the services provided by a Bank fit the definition of
the mandate contract.42 Since a Bank rarely refuses to listen to
a potential Client, a mandate contract - and with it the Duty
of Confidentiality - is created almost every time a Client
comes into contact with a Bank.
C. The Federal Banking Law
The Duty of Confidentiality of Banks is defined by the Fed-
eral Banking Law in Article 47 which deals with criminal
penalties.43
agent] is responsible towards the principal for the careful and faithful execution of
the entrusted services."
41 THEo GuHL, DAS SHWE1ZERISCHE OBLIGATIONENRECHT 497 (1991).
42 Note that a contract between the Bank and the Client is created even if no
formal agreement exists. Article 395 of the Commercial Code provides that
"[u]nless immediately rejected, a mandate is presumed to be accepted if it refers to
services which the agent carries out in an official capacity or on a professional
basis, or if it publicly offers performance of such services."
43 1. Whoever discloses a secret that was entrusted to him, or of which he
has knowledge in his capacity as member of an organ of the bank,
as an employee, agent, liquidator, trustee, observer of the Banking
Commission, or director or as an employee of a chartered account-
ing or audit firm, and whoever instigates another to such violation
of the professional secrecy shall be punished by way of imprison-
ment up to six months or by a fine (up to 50,000 Swiss Francs,
which is currently valued at approximately $35,000 U.S.].
2. If the offender acted negligently the punishment shall be a fine up
to [which is currently valued at approximately $20,000 U.S.].
3. The dissemination of secrets is punished even after termination of
the service, function or employment.
4. The provisions of federal and cantonal law regulating the duty to
inform certain authorities or the obligation to testify in court re-
main applicable.
See art. 47 of FEDERAL BANKING LAw.
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Even though the law does not specifically create a Duty of
Confidentially of Banks, Article 47 indirectly defines the ele-
ments of such duty, namely the obligation to withhold any In-
formation acquired in the performance of Banking-related
activities by any person professionally connected to the Bank.44
Such activities include not only those directly connected with
servicing the Client, but the entire process of receiving Informa-
tion from the Client, analyzing such Information and advising
the Client.
Article 47 punishes intentional and unintentional disclo-
sures of confidential Information. 45 In order to stress the impor-
tance of protecting Information acquired from Clients, Bank
employees are subject to punishment for both negligent and in-
tentional disclosures. In particular it allows for punishing dis-
closures that occur due to a lack of appreciation of the notion of
secrecy.46
Finally, by criminalizing the act of instigating a breach of
the Duty of Confidentiality of Banks, the law protects against
external attacks on Bank confidentiality. The law punishes the
Bank employee who breaches the Banking Secret, as well as in-
dividuals who attempt to learn it. 4 7
IV. LIMrrs TO THE DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY
While the Duty of Confidentiality of Banks is a strictly en-
forced requirement, it is not absolute.48 Article 47 of the Fed-
eral Banking Law, that provides for the criminal punishment of
Banking Secrets, specifies that limits to the Duty of Confidenti-
ality of Banks may be set by federal, as well as cantonal, law.
49
In this chapter we will examine the provisions of public, as well
44 Article 47 of the FEDERAL BANKING LAW expressly mentions employees,
among others, as persons being punished if disclosing a secret. The term employ-
ees includes trainees and volunteers, as well as all other paid and unpaid collabo-
rators of the Bank; see AuBERT ET" AL., supra note 6, at 64.
45 See AutERT ET AL., supra note 6, at 73.
46 This is the case when unauthorized third parties acquire knowledge of the
contents of documents left unattended or otherwise not protected by the Bank. No
intent to disclose is required in this situation. See LOSCHER, supra note 13, at 42.
47 "... whoever instigates another [to disclose a bank secret].. ." art. 47.1 of
the FEDERAL BANIUNG LAw, supra note 43.
48 Under certain, well defined, circumstances the prohibition against disclo-
sure of banking secrets may be lifted; See supra note 24, at 907.
49 See FEDERAL BANmNG LAw, supra note 43, § 4.
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as civil, law limiting the obligations connected to the Duty of
Confidentiality of Banks.
A. Limits Under Civil Law
1. Regulations on Inheritance.
Pursuant to the rules applicable to the contract of mandate,
the Bank has a continuous obligation to inform the Client about
its services. 50 A problem arises, with respect to the heirs, once
the owner of the account dies.
Under Swiss law, after the death of a person, his or her
heirs automatically acquire all rights and obligations not
strictly personal. 51 The Duty of Confidentiality, as well as the
obligation to provide Information are not considered rights hav-
ing a strictly personal character. 52 The Bank's obligations be-
come the rights of the heirs, who are substituted in all effects
into the position of the deceased.5 3 The Bank cannot ignore the
heirs by invoking the Duty of Confidentially towards the de-
ceased. The Bank must deliver to the heirs all Information nec-
essary to establish the amount and substance of the assets of
the deceased.54 Different treatment is reserved for Information
deemed strictly personal. With respect to strictly personal In-
formation, the Duty of Confidentiality of Banks is maintained
also against requests for disclosure by the heirs.55
The right of the heir to receive disclosure of certain Infor-
mation is based on their acquisition of the contractual rights of
the deceased. In addition, their capacity as heir gives them a
legal ground to obtain all Information necessary to establish the
essence of the estate.5 6 Far from being unlimited, such right is
confined to Information necessary to establish the value of the
50 Pursuant to art. 400 of the Commercial Code, the Bank's duty of Informa-
tion arises upon the Client's demand.
51 The Civil Code under § 2 of art. 560 provides that "unless otherwise pro-
vided by applicable law, claims, properties and all other rights of ownership or
disposition of the deceased are transferred to the heirs and the debts of said de-
ceased become their personal debts."
52 DANIEL BODMER ET AL., KOMMENTAR ZUM BUNDESGESETE UEBER DIE
BANKEN UND SPARKASSEN n.17 to art. 47 (6th ed. 1993).
53 BGE 74 I 493.
54 BGE 89 II 93.
55 See BODMER ET AL., supra note 52.
56 See AUBERT ET AL., supra note 6, at 187.
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estate at the decedents time of death.5 7 Information relating to
events occurring prior to the death of the owner are not subject
to disclosure, except in cases when legal heirs try to establish if
values due to the estate had been illegally transferred prior to
death.5 8 With respect to legal heirs, the Duty of Confidentiality
of Banks does not apply in connection with procedures against
the estate pursuant to Article 522 of the Civil Code.59 In those
cases, disclosure must occur also with respect to transactions
prior to the owner's death, except when the express request of
secrecy by the deceased consists of interests superior to the in-
terest of the legal heirs to establish the exact amount of the
estate.60
The right of the heirs to obtain Information based on legal
or contractual rights is general and extends to the estate ad-
ministrators, as well as officials responsible for the inventory of
estate properties.61
2. Powers of Attorney.
The unlimited power of attorney issued by the owner of an
account to a third person, for purposes of operating assets de-
posited on said account, confers to that person all rights to ob-
tain disclosure of any Information.62 Generally, powers of
attorney relating to Bank accounts provide for the extension of
their validity after the death of the issuer.63 Nevertheless, once
the effects of the power of attorney are terminated, the repre-
57 See AuBERT ET AL., supra note 6, at 227.
58 Recently, the Swiss Supreme Court has reviewed its willingness to extend
the right to Information concerning a decedent's acts prior to his/her death for
purposes of establishing transfers of money out of the decedent's accounts into
trust accounts of which the decedent retained beneficial ownership. This willing-
ness would enable heirs to trace payments out of known accounts in order to locate
potential additional assets. See unpublished decision of the Swiss Supreme Court,
Chamber for Civil Law, 14 VIII 92.
59 This procedure allows legal heirs to reduce the amount deposited to third
parties whenever their legal quota is not preserved. See TuOR & SCHNiDER, DAs
SCHWEIZEISCHE ZIVILGESETZBUCH 401 (9th ed. 1979).
60 BGE 74 1 493.
61 BGE 88 II 87.
62 FELIX ERB, DE BANKVOLLMACHT 242 (1974).
63 Thus defeating the automatic termination set forth by art. 35 of the Com-
mercial Code for standard powers of attorney. BGE 101 II 117.
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sentative loses any and all rights to Information from the
Bank.64
A further limitation of the Duty of Confidentiality of Banks
relates to persons with a power of attorney conferred by law to
represent the owner of the Bank account. This is the case of
parents managing the accounts of their children.65 Also in this
case, all Information relating to the account shall be disclosed to
the tutor66 as well as to the curator6 7 of the owner.
B. Limits Under Public Law
1. Criminal and Civil Procedure Provisions.
The protection of Bank secrets is very carefully contem-
plated in connection with judicial proceedings. It is sometimes
the prevailing interest of justice to obtain disclosure of Informa-
tion which is otherwise considered privileged. This is particu-
larly the case in criminal proceedings where the search for
truth represents the primary goal of the process.
a. Rules of Civil Procedure. 68
At the national level, the Federal Code of Civil Procedure
provides that only persons contemplated by Article 321.1 of the
Swiss Penal Code 69 may refuse to be deposed and that all other
individuals bound by the obligation to protect a professional or
business secret must be exempted from testimony by the presid-
ing judge. 70 Nevertheless, because of the structure of the Swiss
judicial system, civil lawsuits at the Federal level are rare and
64 BGE 101 II 119.
65 Article 304, § 1 of the Civil Code.
66 The tutor is nominated in the cases set forth under arts. 368-372 of the
Civil Code. The tutor is responsible pursuant to art. 367 for the personal and fi-
nancial interest of the person under his responsibility.
67 The curator is nominated in the cases set forth under arts. 392-395 of the
Civil Code. The responsibility of the curator is similar to the one of the tutor. See
supra note 66, art. 367. But his function is limited to specific tasks, generally of
financial nature. The right of the curator to obtain disclosure from the Bank de-
pends on the specific task that he has been appointed to accomplish.
68 Under the Swiss Constitution, all matters not regulated by the
Confederation are left to the legislation of the Cantons. Article 3 of the Swiss
Constitution. This is the case for the rules of criminal, civil, and administrative
procedure except with regard to federal proceedings.
69 See infra note 80.
70 Articles 42.1(b) and 42.2 of the Federal Code of Civil Procedure.
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do not substantially impact the principles of civil procedure. 71
Thus, the importance of the limits to the Bank secrecy at that
level is almost irrelevant.
At the Cantons' level the codes of civil procedure follow one
of the following guidelines:72 (i) persons subject to a Duty of
Confidentiality, such as Bankers, lawyers, clerics, do not have
to disclose any secret and may not be deposed to that effect in
civil proceedings;73 (ii) the presiding judge has the authority to
decide, subject to appeal, if, when and to what extent a Bank
employee may be deposed;74 and (iii) the code of civil procedure
itself defines which professionals may or may not be deposed.
75
The cantons following these guidelines generally do not include
Bank employees among the persons exempt from the witness'
obligations.
The relevance of the limits set by the rules of civil proce-
dure covers areas which extend from the most general claims, to
divorces or bankruptcy. In most proceedings the parties find
the disclosure of the opponent's assets both valuable and rele-
vant. Since such disclosure could lead to abuses, the codes of
71 See AUBERT Er AL., supra note 6, at 86.
72 See BODMER ET AL., supra note 52, at n.40 to art. 47; see also AUBERT ET AL.,
supra note 6, at 85-89 and LOSCHER, supra note 13, at 18.
73 Argovie, art. 183.2(b).
Berne, art. 246.1.
Geneva, art. 227.
NeuchAtel, art. 222(b).
74 Fribourg, art. 214.1(c).
Nidwalden, art. 148.2 and 148.3.
Schwyz, art. 238.1(2) and 239.
Ticino, art. 230(b), 230(c), and 231.2.
Uri, art. 192.1(b) and 192.1(d).
Zug, art. 168.1(2) and 169.
Zirich, art. 187.2 and 188.
75 Appenzell Ausserrhoden, art. 160.3.
Appenzel Innerhoden, art. 182.2.
Basel Stadt, art. 116.2.
Basel Land, art. 161.2.
Glarus, art. 176.3.
Grisons, art. 196.2(3).
Lucerne, art. 161.2.
Obwalden, art. 153.1(b) and 153.2.
Schafihouse, art. 203.2.
Soleure, art. 172.1(2) and 172.2.
Thurgovie, art. 259.1.
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol7/iss2/3
DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY
civil procedure often give judges the power to exempt potential
witnesses from testimony.76
b. Rules of Criminal Procedure.
The focus of any criminal procedure is the research of the
truth in the interest of justice. 77 Therefore all codes of criminal
procedure, at the national as well as cantons' level, provide for a
general obligation to intervene as a witness in a proceeding, to
be deposed and to disclose all relevant Information and docu-
mentation.78 Since the criminal procedure looks after the pub-
lic interest - as opposed to the private interest that is the
object of civil proceedings - the effect of Bank secrecy in this
area is substantially limited and the Duty of Confidentiality of
Banks is rarely accepted as a reason to avoid depositions. 79
Therefore the codes of criminal procedure exempt from the
obligation to depose as a witness only those persons falling
under the professional categories contemplated by Article 321 of
the Penal Code.80 In particular, the following categories are ex-
empt from the obligation to depose: clerks, attorneys, notary
publics, 8 ' doctors, dentists, and other specific professionals of
76 See for example, art. 231.2 of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Canton of
Ticino authorizing the judge to "exempt the witness from revealing industrial or
commercial secrets when the witness' interest to preserve the secret exceeds the
interest of the party who wants it revealed."
77 On the relation between criminal law, penal code and punishment see 1
HANs SCHULTZ, EINFOHRUNG IN DEN ALLGEMEINEN TEIL DES STRAFREcHTs 23-50
(4th ed. 1982).
78 See LoSCHER, supra note 13, at 18.
79 See AusERT ET AL., supra note 6, at 95.
80 Clerics, attorneys at law, defense counsels, notary publics, auditors sub-
ject to duty of confidentiality pursuant to the Commercial Code, doctors,
dentists, pharmacists, midwifes, as well as their assistants who disclose a
secret which was communicated to them in connection with their profes-
sional services or of which they have acquired knowledge in relation to [such
professional services] will be punished, contingent upon charges being
pressed by the victim, with the imprisonment or a fine. Same punishment
will be handed down to students for disclosure of secrets whose knowledge
they acquired during their studies. The disclosure remains punishable even
after the person subject to the duty of confidentiality stops exercising his
profession or terminates his studies.
Article 321.1 of the Swiss Penal Code.
81 The role of the notary public in civil law systems is considerably more rele-
vant than in common law countries. In Switzerland, the notary public is a figure
embodying certain governmental powers and is subject to very strict requirements
of professional conduct.
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the healthcare sector. Those professionals are criminally liable
for the disclosure of Information qualifying as secrets; substan-
tially all Information they acquire during their professional ac-
tivities. Although bound by a Duty of Confidentiality, all other
persons not expressly contemplated by Article 321 of the Penal
Code are subject to the obligation to depose in criminal proceed-
ings and to disclose all relevant Information and documenta-
tion.8 2 Not being covered by said provision of the Penal Code,
Bank employees must therefore comply with the general obliga-
tion to serve as witnesses in criminal proceedings.8 3
This limit to the Duty of Confidentiality of Banks is never-
theless subject to strict interpretation.8 4 Disclosures must in-
clude only Information relevant to the investigation. Any
Information related to third parties not involved in such investi-
gation are subject to absolute protection.8 5 In particular, it is
important that Information disclosed in connection with a
specific investigation are not used for other unauthorized
purposes.86
2. Tax Regulations.
Taxpayers in Switzerland undergo the same treatment as
in the United States: they must file a tax return indicating all
elements necessary to establish the tax due and, upon request
of the tax authorities, they must provide all documentation rele-
82 The list of professionals subject to the Duty of Confidentiality pursuant to
art. 321.1 of the Penal Code is exclusive and can not be extended by including
other professional categories, even of similar character. BGE 83 IV 197.
83 The Swiss Supreme Court has clearly stated that art. 321 of the Penal Code
is subject to strict interpretation. See e.g., BGE 95 I 139. The Penal Code cannot
be interpreted as covering professional categories, such as Bank employees, which
are not expressly contemplated within the statute.
84 See AUBERT ET AL., supra note 6, at 97.
85 For example, any Information related to payments made to or from the ac-
count, which is the object of disclosure, must not be revealed if not directly related
to individuals involved in the criminal investigation.
86 This is the case when other parties to the proceeding acquire knowledge of
documents disclosed in connection with a specific case. See LO3SCHER, supra note
13, at 96. In a controversy involving the U.S. Government, the Swiss Supreme
Court has stated that in certain situations the right of the parties to acquire
knowledge of documents disclosed in a proceeding may be limited. See BGE 95 I
451. The decision is to be taken by the presiding judge based on the evaluation of
the prevailing interest. See BGE 92 1 263.
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vant to the tax assessment.8 7 Therefore, taxpayers shall pro-
vide the tax authorities with all documents certifying their
relations with third parties.8 Third parties on the other hand
have an obligation to deliver to the taxpayer all such documents
that are in their possession. 9 Finally, if taxpayers do not de-
liver sufficient and satisfactory documents, the tax authority
has a legal right to obtain from third parties all documents re-
quired for the tax assessment.90
The obligation of third parties to provide Information to the
tax authorities does not apply to persons or entities who are
under a legally mandated Duty of Confidentiality. 91 Therefore,
even when a taxpayer refuses to deliver sufficient documenta-
tion to the tax authorities, Banks have no obligation to release
any statement or Information whatsoever.92
The Banks' obligation is to release documents to the Client.
The decision to disclose to the tax authority is left to the Cli-
ent.9 3 The consequence of nondisclosure for the Client is a tax
penalty on top of a tax assessment based solely upon the arbi-
trary estimate by the tax authority, 94 generally higher than the
"should be" tax burden.95
The obligation of Banks to provide statements to their Cli-
ents describing their relation is limited to (i) the relation of the
Client with a specific branch96 and (ii) the relation which ex-
isted in the past or is still existing at the time of the inquiry.97
87 HEINZ MASsHARDT, CoMMENTARio ALIA LEGGE SULL'IMPOSTA FEDERALE
DIRETA 391-392 (1989).
88 Article 126 Law on Federal Income Tax [hereinafter "LFIT'].
89 Article 127(e) LFIT.
90 Article 127.2 LFIT.
91 Id.
92 See BODMER ET AL., supra note 52, at n.45 to art. 47.
93 CHRISTOPH IM OBERSTEG, Die Bescheinigungespflichten Von Bank Und
Kunde Im Veranlagunsverfahren Der Direkten Bundessteuer, BErrRAGE ZUM
SCHWEIZERISCHEN BANKENRECHT 415 (1987).
94 Article 130.2 LFIT.
95 See MASSHARDT, supra note 87, at 390.
96 Associazione Svizzera dei Banchieri, circ. No. 6497 11.10, at 10 (1988).
Under Swiss law, branches are treated as independent legal entities who enter
their own contracts, sue independently, and are sued at their domicile. See OBER-
STEG, supra note 93, at 417-18.
97 See art. 127(e) LFIT. The consequence is that a Bank is under the obliga-
tion to provide negative statements. This Information could confirm the non-exist-
ence of a Banking relation.
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The same applies to disclosures required from Banks in connec-
tion with criminal investigations 98 and in the cases of tax fraud
in which judicial assistance is granted.99
3. Anti-Money-Laundering Legislation.
On August 1, 1990 Article 305 (bis) on Money Launder-
ing'00 and Article 305 (ter) on Lack of Due Diligence in Finan-
cial Transactions' 01 were adopted in the Swiss Penal Code.
Those two provisions allow for the punishment of individuals
who impede the recovery of money related to criminal activity,
as well as those individuals that in the performance of their pro-
fessional activity failed to verify the identity of the beneficial
owner of money they handled. The necessity for Switzerland's
adoption of an efficient legal basis to fight organized crime be-
came apparent during the 1980's in connection with interna-
tional prosecutions for drug smuggling and other drug related
crimes.' 0 2
Both provisions do not create new responsibilities for the
Banks, which prior to their adoption were already liable for
98 See BODMER ET AL., supra note 52, at n.88 to art. 47.
99 PAOLO BERNASCONI, Droits et devoir de la banque et de ses clients dlans la
procedure d'entraide judiciaire internationale en matiere pdnale, BErrRAGE ZUM
SCHWEIZERISCHEN BANKENRECHT 349 (1987).
100 1. Whosoever undertakes actions which lend themselves to defeat the
ascertainment of origin, the discovery or collection of assets which,
as he knows or must assume, emanate from crime, will be subject to
punishment by imprisonment or a fine.
2. In severe cases punishment is seclusion up to five years or impris-
onment. Added to this penalty of detention is a fine of up to one
million francs. A severe case is if the perpetrator: a) acts as a
member of a criminal organization; b) acts as a member of a crimi-
nal organization whose purpose is the continued practice of money-
laundering; c) realizes a large turnover or considerable profit from
professional money laundering activities.
3. The perpetrator will also be subject to sentencing if he commits the
principal act of violation abroad and such act is also punishable in
the place of perpetration.
Article 305 (his) of the Swiss Penal Code.
101 Whoever professionally accepts, keeps in safe custody, assists in the in-
vestment or transfer of assets which are the property of others and fails
to apply the relative due diligence required for establishing the identity
of the economic beneficiary, is subject to punishment by imprisonment
of up to one year or a fine.
Article 305 (ter) of the Swiss Penal Code.
102 CHRISTOPH K. GRABER, GELDWASCHEREI 100 (1990).
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knowingly accepting money related to criminal activities based
on Article 3.2(c) of the Federal Banking Law.'0 3 This provision
was strengthened by the principles of the Due Diligence Agree-
ment.10 4 Nevertheless, problems appeared in the process of
identifying and defining the attitude that Banks had to adopt in
dealing with money of unclear origin or other assets that the
Bank could suspect of being related to criminal activity.10 5 Arti-
cles 305 (bis) and (ter) of the Penal Code sought to diminish the
103 Article 3.2(c) of the FEDERAL BANKING LAW requires, when issuing a bank-
ing license, that "the individuals responsible for the administration and manage-
ment of the Bank be of good repute and warrant an irreproachable activity." Id.
104 The agreement on the Swiss Banks' code of conduct with regard to the exer-
cise of due diligence, commonly referred to as the "Due Diligence Agreement," is
individually entered into by the Swiss Bankers Association with its members.
Pursuant to the agreement, the signatory Banks commit to the observance of cer-
tain due diligence measures, including:
Verification Of The Contracting Partner's Identity:
1) The banks undertake to verify the identity of the contracting partner
when establishing business relations with said partner.
2) This rule applies to:
- the opening of accounts or passbooks;
- the opening of securities accounts;
- the entering into of fiduciary transactions;
- the renting of safe-deposit boxes;
- cash transactions exceeding the amount of Sfr. 25,000.
Article 2 of the Due Diligence Agreement.
Ascertaining The Identity Of The Beneficial Owner:
1) If, when a business relationship is entered into by way of opening an
account, passbook or securities account, or when a fiduciary transaction
is entered into, there is any doubt as to whether the contracting partner
is himself the beneficial owner, the bank shall require by means of Form
A a written statement setting forth the identity of the beneficial owner.
2) If the amount of a cash transaction exceeds Sfr. 25,000 the bank must
require the contracting partner to provide a declaration setting forth the
identity of the beneficial owner. The bank shall keep such declaration on
record in an appropriate manner. The use of Form A is optional.
Article 3 of the Due Diligence Agreement.
Prohibition Against Active Assistance In The Flight Of Capital:
1) Banks may not provide any active assistance whatsoever in transferring
capital outside countries whose laws prohibit said transfers or impose
restrictions on the placing of funds abroad.
Article 7 of the Due Diligence Agreement.
Prohibition Against Actively Assisting In Tax Evasion And Similar Acts:
1) Banks shall not provide any assistance to their customers in acts aimed
at deceiving Swiss and foreign authorities, particularly tax authorities, by
means of incomplete or otherwise misleading attestations.
Article 8 of the Due Diligence Agreement.
105 In note 6590 of July 5, 1990 at 2, the Swiss Banking Association pointed out
that it was necessary to clarify at what time business relations with Clients have
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above identification problem and clearly set forth the principle
that in the financial world good faith in dealing with unknown
parties could no longer be presumed.10 6
On May 1, 1992 the Federal Banking Commission enacted
specific directives providing for guidelines on the interpretation
of Article 305 (bis) and (ter) of the Penal Code.10 7 In addition to
clarifying the position of Banks in connection to Article 305 (bis)
and (ter), the directive took into consideration, and to some ex-
tent adopted, the international recommendations for the fight
against money laundering. Nevertheless, such directives are
applicable only to personnel of financial institutions and do not
apply to criminal justice. -0 8 The power and effect of such direc-
tive is similar to the power and effect of directives adopted in
other countries pursuant to Recommendation No. 28 of the In-
ternational Financial Action Task Force on Money-Laundering
("FATF"). 109 The directive of the Federal Banking Commission
sets forth guidelines on the attitude to be adopted by Banks
when confronted with suspicions that certain assets are related
to criminal activities. In particular, the directive provides for
the possibility to inform the authorities in the event of serious
doubts as to the origin of specific assets. 110 Such possibility was
to be terminated. The note establishes when Banks should be alerted that assets
received or given to a Client are related to criminal activity.
106 PETER NOBEL, Operazioni Finanziarie in Svizzera: La Diligenza Necces-
saria Dopo La Nuova Normativa Penale, 4 Rep. 109 (1990).
107 See supra note 80 and supra note 100.
108 PAOLO BERNASCONI, Fonti Giuridiche Riguardanti La Diligenza
Nell'Accettazione Di Fondi, IL SISTEMA BANcAmo SVIZZERO CoNTRO IL RIcIcLAGGIo
28 (1993).
109... the competent authorities should establish guidelines which will as-
sist financial institutions in detecting suspicious patterns of behavior by
their customers. It is understood that such guidelines must develop over
time, and will never be exhaustive. It is further understood that such guide-
lines will primarily serve as an educational tool for financial institutions'
personnel.
International Financial Action Task Force on Money-Laundering, Recommenda-
tion No. 28 ("FATF").
110 Federal Banking Commission's directive, § 9, provides that "[ulpon suspect
of criminal origin of funds and depending on the reasons for such suspects, Banks
have either to closely monitor the relation with the client, or to undertake addi-
tional verifications, or to decline or terminate the business relation and/or inform
the authorities competent for criminal prosecution." FATF, supra note 109.
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also contemplated in § 17 of the guidelines issued by the
FATF.111
Nevertheless, since directives of the Federal Banking Com-
mission do not supersede the requirements set forth by law,
Banks could not use the power of communication provided for in
the May 1, 1992 directive. Although in Note 5 to the directive,
the Federal Banking Commission had determined that a good
faith notification to the criminal authorities would not expose
Banks to the criminal consequences of the violation of the Duty
of Confidentiality, doubt about this interpretation was wide-
spread even within the Federal Banking Commission. No as-
surance against civil or criminal claims for violation of the Duty
of Confidentiality could be found because the exclusionary
grounds of the Penal Code were not applicable in that specific
case.112 It was therefore apparent that the adoption of legal
provisions regulating the issue were mandatory.
On August 1, 1994 a provision was enacted in the Penal
Code specifically allowing any employee of the financial sector
to disclose all Information generating the doubt that certain as-
sets are related to criminal activity.113 Nevertheless, the issues
confronting Banks are far from being resolved. Questions arise
in connection with the legitimization of the doubt, with its justi-
fication and with the valuation of the elements that generate it.
Criminal tribunals need to identify the minimum requirements
justifying a doubt and therefore allowing disclosure. 1 4 A legal
proceeding for wrongful disclosure is still possible in case of
negligence in judging the facts or whenever a mistake could
have been avoided by using diligence in the evaluation of the
Information. 115
111 See FATF, supra note 109.... if financial institutions suspect that funds
stem from a criminal activity they should be permitted or required to report
promptly their suspicions to the competent authorities..." FATF, supra note 109.
112 NIKLAus ScHmm, Insiderdelikte und Geldwascherel, AKTUELLE PROBLEME
IM BANKREcHT 205 (1994).
113 A second paragraph was added to art. 305 (ter), see supra note 100, provid-
ing that: "The persons covered by the first paragraph of this article have the right
to disclose to the Swiss authorities in charge of criminal prosecution, as well as to
all other federal authorities designated by the law, any information originating the
doubt that certain assets emanate from crime." Id.
114 See SCHMID, supra note 112, at 206.
115 See art. 47.2 of the FEDERAL BANKING LAw, supra note 22, art. 47.2, which
sets forth the punishability of negligent violations of the Duty of Confidentiality of
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V. CONSEQUENCES FOR BREACH OF THE DuTY
OF CONFIDENTIALITY
Breach of the Duty of Confidentiality of Banks generates
three types of consequences: criminal, civil and administrative.
The breaching party is not limited to the person disseminating
the Information, but may also be his or her employer; e.g., the
Bank. 116 By making the employer liable, Swiss law sets a clear
standard requiring the Bank to closely supervise and monitor
how confidential Information is handled.
A. Criminal Penalties
Pursuant to Article 47 of the Federal Banking Law, the
penalty for breach by an individual of the Duty of Confidential-
ity of Banks can be imprisonment and/or a fine."17 In addition
to the person directly responsible for the breach, the instigator,
regardless of whether a breach has actually occurred, is subject
to Article 47.118 In this regard, the Federal Banking Law sets
forth a fundamental difference between prosecution of the
breach of confidentiality by Banks and prosecution of the same
breaches by other professionals (such as doctors, lawyers or
clerics) pursuant to Article 321 of the Penal Code. While the
prosecution pursuant to Article 321 of the Penal Code requires
the victim to bring charges, the breach of the Duty of Confiden-
tiality of Banks is a state crime and is prosecuted whether or
not the victim has brought charges. Thus, the crime is prose-
Banks. See also, Messaggio concernente la modificazione del Codice penale svizzero
e del Codice penale militare, HI Foglio federale 193 (September 1993).
116 While the Bank itself is not subject to the criminal consequences set forth
for the direct violation of the Duty of Confidentiality under art. 47 of the FEDERAL
BANKING LAw, it may be liable for damages caused by an illegal disclosure pursu-
ant to the regulation of commercial and civil law. Additionally, it may incur in
administrative consequences, such as the withdrawal of the Banking license, set
forth under the FEDERAL BANIUNG LAw generally.
117 See generally art. 47, supra note 43. The imprisonment and the fine can be
cumulated pursuant to art. 50 of the Swiss Penal Code.
11s Contrary to principles applicable to the violation of official and professional
secrets pursuant to arts. 320 and 321 of the Penal Code, not only the completed
instigation, but also the attempted instigation to violate a banking secret is pun-
ished under art. 47.2 of the FEDERAL BANKING LAW supra note 43.
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cuted every time the authority, generally the Attorney Gen-
eral's Office, acquires knowledge of a breach. 119
B. Civil Claims
Individuals and Banks may be sued in civil courts for viola-
tions of Bank secrecy. The principal claims are based on Arti-
cles 41 and 49 of the Commercial Code which deal with the civil
consequences of illegal acts.120 Since Article 28 of the Civil
Code 121 sets forth a duty that includes the Duty of Confidential-
ity of Banks, when a violation occurs the victim has the right to
be indemnified for damages under Article 41 of the Commercial
Code.' 22 Under Article 49 of the Commercial Code, the victim
may also be compensated for pain and suffering. 123
In addition to Articles 41 and 49, which specifically involve
the breach of Article 28 of the Civil Code, under the Commercial
Code a breach of Bank secrecy triggers reparation rights inher-
ent in the contract. 124 The provisions concerning breach of con-
tract, beginning with Article 97, also provide the victim with
(among other rights) a general right to be compensated for
damages. 125
The Commercial Code also provides the legal grounds for a
claim for damages if a contract did not arise or if disclosures
119 Note also, that where a crime can be punished only upon formal complaint
of the victim, the charge must be brought within three months from the day in
which the victim acquired knowledge of the violation. See art. 29 of the Penal Code.
The statute of limitation for violations of the Duty of Confidentiality of Banks is
five years from the day in which the violation has been committed. See art. 51.3 of
the FEDERAL BAIKInG LAw.
120 See OFTINGER, supra note 37, for a discussion of arts. 41 to 61 of the Com-
mercial Code.
121 See OFTINGER, supra note 37.
122 IDA HARDEGGER, BANK-RECHTSKUNDE 126 (1988).
123 The judge has latitude regarding the amount of the compensation. BGE 108
II 352.
124 See GUHL, supra note 41, at 223.
125 It is necessary that the victim proves the existence of a monetary damage
and of a direct relation between the violation of the Duty of Confidentiality and
such damage. In contrast, the Bank can prove that no fault can be imputed to its
handling of the Information, thus excluding liability; see BODMER ET AL., supra
note 52, at n.105 to art. 47 of the FEDERAL BANKING LAw. See also BGE 113 11352
(on the treatment of claims for damages relating to breaches of the Duty of
Confidentiality).
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occurred after termination of the contractual relationship with
the Bank.126
C. Administrative Consequences
The breach of the Duty of Confidentiality of Banks also gen-
erates certain administrative consequences for both the person
responsible for the breach and for the Bank. An employee
breaching Bank secrecy will certainly end up dismissed, and
other individuals such as directors or auditors may also see the
end of their association with the Bank. 127 The Bank itself faces
two types of administrative measures: it may loose its license to
engage in Banking activities in Switzerland, or it may be ex-
pelled from the Federation of Swiss Banks. Both measures
have a catastrophic effect and are strong incentives for Banks to
monitor and preserve confidential Information.128
VI. DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY, JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE AND THE
PROSECUTION OF CORRUPTION IN ITALY
A. Applicable Principles
The Duty of Confidentiality of Banks in Switzerland is well
structured and strictly enforced against interferences from
abroad. Nevertheless, under certain, well-defined circum-
stances, the prohibition against disclosures of Banking secrets
may be lifted pursuant to international treaties. In addition,
these disclosures may be lifted by domestic law.
Far from giving "carte blanche" to disclosures, the conven-
tions and treaties carefuily limit the situations in which the
126 The theory of the "culpa in contrahendo" has been developed by scholars
and supported by the jurisprudence although not directly mentioned in the Com-
mercial Code. The theory allows for the contractual protection against those dam-
ages which occur before a contract is formed. Most important, protection is also
offered in those cases where negotiations have not been successful. Pursuant to
the doctrine of"culpa in contrahendo," parties have certain contractual obligations
in the pre-contractual phases. Accordingly, the beginning of the negotiations be-
tween the Bank and a potential Client imposes on the Bank the duty to preserve
the confidentiality of the Information received. See AUBERT ET AL., supra note 6, at
42.
127 See AUBERT ET AL., supra note 6, at 35.
128 The Federal Banking Commission has the power to withdraw the license of
a Bank pursuant to art. 23 (quinquies) of the FEDERAL BANKING LAw. Before
adopting such an extreme measure, the Federal Banking Commission may inter-
vene adopting intermediate measures pursuant to art. 23 (ter) 1 and 4.
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Duty of Confidentiality of Banks may be lifted. The following
are the general principles which govern the application by
Switzerland of all conventions and treaties concerning mutual
assistance in judicial matters.' 29 They are the "sine qua non"
for the lifting of Bank secrecy.' 30
1. Protection of Privacy.
In protecting the individual's right to privacy, Switzerland
follows the standards and principles developed within the Euro-
pean Community. The definition of privacy, in what is certainly
an oversimplification of the concept, includes all elements that
contribute to the development and existence of the person as an
individual.' 3 ' As one of those elements, the individual's finan-
cial life will be protected from unjustified interferences. 32
129 Next to specific treaties with individual countries, the main legislative acts
which provide a legal basis for the lifting of Bank secrecy are the Hague Conven-
tion of March 5, 1957 on Civil Proceedings; the European Convention of April 20,
1959 on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters; and the Federal Law of
March 30, 1981 on International Assistance in Criminal Matters.
130 These principles apply to any provision for mutual legal assistance in all
treaties signed by Switzerland. Among them are the Income Tax Treaty Between
Switzerland and the United States of January 1, 1951, the United States-Switzer-
land Treaties on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters dated May 25, 1973 and
December 23, 1975, the Switzerland-United States Understanding Concerning
Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters and the Switzerland-United
States Memorandum of Understanding on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
and Ancillary Proceedings of November 10, 1987.
The Income Tax Treaty of 1951 states in its provision concerning the Ex-
change of Information under art. XVI. 1 that: "[n]o information shall be exchanged
which would disclose any trade, business, industrial or professional secret or any
trade process." On the other hand, the Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters limits its scope to assistance in connection with the prosecution of specific
crimes. Under art. 2 of the treaty, assistance is expressly denied in investigations
or proceedings concerning, among others, political offenses, the violation of laws
relating to military obligations, the enforcement of cartel or antitrust laws and the
violation of tax and customs laws (except in connection with the prosection of or-
ganized crime).
Furthermore, under the provision concerning Limitations on Use of Informa-
tion, the principle of specialty is set forth in clear terms. In fact, art. 5 provides
that Information obtained pursuant to the treaty shall not be used in any proceed-
ing relating to an offense other than the offense for which assistance has been
granted.
131 See supra, section III, part A.
132 JoRG PAuL MULLER, ELEMENTE EINER SCHWEIZERISCHE GRUNDRECHTTHEORI
49 (1982).
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2. Only Evidence Available Under Domestic Law.
Foreign authorities may obtain, by invoking a treaty con-
cerning mutual assistance in judicial matters, evidence that can
be obtained only under Swiss law. 133
3. Specialty.
This principle requires that Information provided under a
treaty with a foreign country be used only for the purposes for
which it was provided.134 For example, Information provided in
connection with the prosecution of certain crimes may not be
used against a party not involved in such crimes, or against a
party involved in such crimes but in connection with a different
offense.' 3 5
4. Reciprocity.
Pursuant to this principle, legal assistance is provided only
in connection with charges that could also be brought under
Swiss law.'3 6 Likewise, Information provided pursuant to legal
assistance treaties can be used only to the extent the purpose of
such use is recognized under Swiss law.' 37 For example, Swiss
authorities may not provide judicial assistance in prosecuting
criminal activities that are not "criminal" in Switzerland. Simi-
larly, Information provided in connection with a crime recog-
'33 See art. 63.1 of the Federal Law March 30, 1981 on International Assist-
ance In Criminal Matters.
134 Compliance with this principle is presumed with regard to countries with
which a treaty has been executed; BODMER ET AL., supra note 98, at n.70(a) to art.
47. With respect to other countries, prior to delivery of Information, assurances
are requested that no use will be made other than for the investigation in connec-
tion with which assistance was granted. When assurances are not given, a note
with respect to the use authorized is delivered with the Information. BGE 115 Ib
377; BGE 107 Ib 394; BGE 105 Ib 423.
135 Information obtained pursuant to a proceeding of international mutual
assistance cannot be used for purposes of inquiry nor as evidence in proceedings,
such as tax evasion, for which assistance is not allowed. BGE 115 lb 376.
136 The exam of courts is directed to the existence of those elements which ob-
jectively determine the existence of a crime under Swiss law. See BGE 110 Ib 182;
BGE 117 Ib 268.
137 The request for judicial assistance must provide such description of the acts
under prosecution, sufficient for the Swiss authority to determine that such acts
are considered crimes also under Swiss law. A general description of the crime,
such as "fraud," is therefore not considered sufficient to support a request for judi-
cial assistance. BGE 106 lb 264; BGE 103 Ia 210.
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nized as such in Switzerland may not be used to prosecute
another offense that under Swiss law is not a crime. 138
5. Proportionality.
This requirement applies to any governmental intervention
and must therefore be observed also in connection with judicial
assistance among states, whether or not based on a specific
treaty. 3 9 Thus, the principle of proportionality allows acts of
assistance to be granted only to the extent that they appear nec-
essary to the specific foreign proceeding 140 and provided that
the interests of justice and public order prevail over the interest
to protect the confidentiality of the Information.143 Accord-
ingly, Information regarding unrelated third parties are not to
be provided unless absolutely necessary to the prosecution of
the case and justified by the importance of the investigation.142
A significant limit set by the principle of proportionality is the
prohibition against the so called "fishing expedition." These
types of requests are made against large groups of people in the
hopes of finding evidence against individuals on which there are
otherwise not sufficient grounds to individually obtain assist-
ance. The generalized request for Information concerning large
groups of persons violates the principle of proportionality when
it is not supported by specific indications justifying the request
against each of the members of the group. The Swiss Supreme
Court has found that judicial legal assistance shall not be
granted for the purpose of justifying accusations or suspicions
and that requests shall only be accepted in those cases that al-
ready present serious reasons and evidence for suspicion or
accusation.143
6. No Assistance for Political, Military, or Tax Related
Offenses.
All treaties signed by Switzerland set forth the exclusion of
judicial assistance for the purpose of prosecuting political, tax
138 BGE 111 lb 315 (This decision denied assistance on the ground that under
Swiss law conspiracy cannot be prosecuted on its own as an independent offense).
139 BGE 106 lb 260.
140 See BERNASCONI, supra note 99, at 396-397.
141 BGE 101 Ia 10-11.
142 BGE 113 lb 165; BGE 112 Tb 462.
143 BGE 118 lb 122; BGE 103 Ia 122.
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or military offenses.'14 One exception is generally admitted in
connection with the prosecution of tax fraud (as opposed to the
mere tax evasion) for which assistance is granted subject to
compliance with the strict requirements set forth by the Swiss
Supreme Court.145
7. Principles Affecting the Position of the Bank.
The Swiss Supreme Court has confirmed on many occasions
two basic principles affecting the position of Banks in connec-
tion with a proceeding of judicial assistance. The Swiss
Supreme Court has held that Banks, when notified of an order
of disclosure, have an obligation to inform their Clients.146
With respect to their position in the assistance proceeding, the
Swiss Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed that Banks
have an independent right to appeal an order of disclosure.' 47
This conclusion stems from the basic assumption that Banks
have a personal interest in protecting their own business rela-
tions with Clients against unjustified or illegal interferences. 148
B. The Request for Assistance by Italy and the Response from
Switzerland
1. The Facts.
In May 1992 the Italian authorities asked the support of
their Swiss counterparts in connection with the prosecution of
corruption among Italian politicians and public employees.
During their inquiry, the Italian prosecutors had found evi-
dence that on many occasions the financial transactions in the
corruption scheme, e.g. the payment of the bribe, had occurred
by way of money transfers between accounts in Swiss Banks.
144 See United States-Switzerland Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal
Matters, May 25, 1973, art. 2.
145 The Swiss Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the tax fraud exception
is not intended to assist in connection with the prosecution of all tax offenses. It
has therefore strictly defined the conditions upon which assistance for tax fraud
may be granted and the requirements necessary to show the existence of tax fraud.
BGE 116 lb 103; BGE 115 Tb 78; BGE 111 lb 242.
146 BGE 113 Ib 168; BGE 110 lb 88.
147 BGE 118 Ib 442; See also Court of Appeals CRP 3/9/92, Rep. 342 (1992).
148 For a discussion of the interest of Banks to protect their business relations
with Clients in connection with assistance proceedings. See BODMER ET AL., supra
note 52, at n.58 to art. 47.
[Vol. 7:329
30http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol7/iss2/3
DUTY OF CONFIDENTIALITY
Based on that assessment, the Italian authorities formally noti-
fied a request for assistance to the Public Prosecutor and to the
Instruction Judge of the Canton of Ticino. 149
2. The Decree of the Public Prosecutor.
Based on the Information included in the request for judi-
cial assistance notified by the Italian authorities, the Public
Prosecutor suspected that third parties in Switzerland were re-
sponsible for handling and managing such bribes. He therefore
formally opened an independent investigation into the alleged
crimes of money-laundering and receiving stolen goods. In con-
nection with his inquiry, the Prosecutor ordered all Banks in
the Canton of Ticino (i) to disclose any and all Information re-
lated to accounts that might be held by said Banks in the name
and for the account of forty-four persons, and (ii) the seizure of
all amounts found on any such accounts. 150
The decree of the Public Prosecutor was "self-serving," e.g.
was intended only for purposes of his own investigation and was
not intended to satisfy the request for assistance by the Italian
authorities. The issue on hand was to ascertain if, by whom,
and to what extent one or more crimes had been committed in
Switzerland.151
3. The Decree of the Instruction Judge.
The decree of the Instruction Judge was a response to the
request for assistance by the Italian authorities. The order di-
rected to all Banks in the Canton of Ticino was substantially
the same as the one issued by the Public Prosecutor. All credit
institutions were required to provide Information on, and to
seize all funds deposited in, any account in the name or for the
benefit of the same forty-four persons indicated by the Public
Prosecutor. 152
With his decree, the Instruction Judge was positively re-
sponding to the request for assistance by the Italian authorities.
149 An extensive presentation of the events which have caused the intervention
of the Swiss authorities is included in the decision of the Court of Appeals CRP 3/9/
92 published in Rep. 334-372 (1992).
150 Id. at 338.
151 Id.
152 Id.
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His purpose was (i) to gather Information to send to Italy for
use in a criminal investigation therein, and (ii) to obtain control
of funds which were purportedly derived or otherwise connected
with criminal activities. 15 3
4. The Appeals.
Both decrees were appealed by Banks as well as by most of
the owners of the accounts.
Against the decree of the Public Prosecutor, the appellants
claimed violations of form, as well as substantiation require-
ments. It was also claimed that the decree had the character of
a "fishing expedition" which is prohibited under Swiss law.
With respect to the object of the inquiry, the appellants claimed
that (i) the crimes did not materialize as such; (ii) the antece-
dent crimes, necessary for the existence of the crime of money-
laundering, do not exist under Swiss law; and (iii) there was no
urgency to justify such a general and vague decree.154
The claims against the decree of the Instruction Judge were
based on violations of the form requirements and on the lack of
substance in the request for judicial assistance by the Italian
authorities. The notification of the Italian authorities was con-
sidered to lack sufficient description of the crimes imputed. The
appellants claimed that, the description being necessary to ver-
ify the punishability of the crimes in Switzerland, it became
impossible to establish if the decree was justified. Pursuant to
the appeal, it was impossible to verify if the acts imputed in
Italy represented political or tax crimes. Furthermore, the ap-
pellants claimed there were no facts to suggest crimes had been
committed in Italy which were punishable under Swiss law.
Finally, the decree of the Instruction Judge was opposed for
representing a "fishing expedition" and for being
disproportional. 155
Both the Public Prosecutor and the Instruction Judge op-
posed the Appeal.
153 Id.
154 Id.
155 Id. at 338-339.
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C. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
Before entering the discussion of the Court decision itself,
we note that the appeals against the decrees of both the Instruc-
tion Judge and Public Prosecutor were held jointly by the Court
of Appeals. The Court found that not only were the facts upon
which the decrees rested similar, but also the legal issues aris-
ing were common. The argument for consistency of judgment,
arising out of the joint appeals, was considered with the techni-
cal problems that a separation of the proceedings would have
generated. 156 Furthermore, while a separation of the proceed-
ings would have been in the interest of privacy, the list with the
names of the parties involved had received such publicity from
the media that a severance of the appeals would not have pre-
served privacy.
Since no reason existed for the Court to produce separate
sentences, all appeals against the two decrees were joined.
Nevertheless, the examination of the specific issues arising out
of the two decrees was conducted separately except with regard
to procedural issues.
1. Procedural Issues.
In addition to the issue of the joinder of the appeals, the
Court identified three major questions: (i) the right of Banks to
appeal; (ii) the right of the owners of the accounts to appeal
anonymously; and (iii) the compliance of the decrees with re-
quirements of form.
The main arguments of the Public Prosecutor and of the
Instruction Judge in favor of denying the right of Banks to ap-
peal their decrees were that Banks could not be considered a
party to the judicial assistance proceeding, nor to the independ-
ent prosecution investigation. In essence, for the Public Prose-
cutor and Instruction Judge, parties to the process were
technically only those authorities requiring Information or indi-
viduals required to disclose Information. Banks were deemed
mere instrumentalities of the investigation, purportedly thus
deprived of a legitimate interest in appeal. While recognizing
that Banks were not parties to the two proceedings, the Court
found that the Banks had an independent interest to protect
156 Id. at 341.
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their Duty of Confidentiality. Thus, confirming prior jurispru-
dence, 157 the Court of Appeals accorded Banks a limited right to
appeal decrees which violated their interest in safeguarding the
Duty of Confidentiality.
Since Banks intervened in the appdal to protect their own
interests in the preservation of confidentiality and to defend
their Client's interests, the grounds that could be invoked
against the decrees were limited. Accordingly, the Court of Ap-
peals permitted the Banks to raise all formal objections, includ-
ing the lack of proportionality and the reservation against
"fishing expeditions." 158 Confirming prior decisions, the Court
of Appeals allowed Banks to raise issues relating to the objec-
tive elements of the crime which would deny judicial assist-
ance,1 59 such as the statute of limitations, 60 but did not admit
claims relating to the non-fulfillment of the subjective elements
of the crime. The Court concluded that Banks have a specific,
as well as a legal, obligation to protect confidential Client ac-
count Information. Accordingly, Banks were recognized as hav-
ing the right to appeal the decrees based on their individual
rights.
The Public Prosecutor and Instruction Judge also contested
the Banks' right of appeal. The reasoning was that if a Bank
had not maintained any relation with an individual, such Bank
had no Duty of Confidentiality to protect Information which did
not exist. Pursuant to this reasoning, then only Banks who
maintained or had previously maintained accounts for the indi-
vidual(s) who were the object of the inquiry were subjected to
the decrees. Any other Bank lacked a legitimate interest in the
appeal. The Court of Appeals dismissed the argument on the
notion that it would defeat the purpose of the appeal process.' 6 '
In fact, under those circumstances, an appeal against a disclo-
sure order would result in a positive response to the disclosure
requested by such order. The Court of Appeals argued that dis-
cretion on the mere existence of a Banking relation, not only on
the details of the relation itself, is mandated by the essence of
157 BGE 105 Tb 429.
158 CRP 3/9/92, at 344.
159 BGE 117 1b 54.
160 BGE 112 Ia 602.
161 CRP 3/9/92, at 342-343.
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the Duty of Confidentiality of Banks. The appeal against a dis-
closure order could represent in itself a disclosure and thus a
potential violation of the Duty of Confidentiality. The
paradoxal consequence of the Public Prosecutor's reasoning
would put Banks in an automatic disclosure situation: if the
decree is not appealed, disclosure must follow; if a decree is ap-
pealed, the existence of a Banking relation is disclosed. In both
instances, Banks could incur a violation of the Duty of Confi-
dentiality. Thus, the Court of Appeals rejected this argument
and confirmed the right of Banks to appeal both decrees.1 62
The right of account owners to appeal, without disclosing
their identity, was contested by the City of Milan, which the
Court of Appeals had admitted as a party to the proceeding.16 3
Referring to its own precedents,164 the Court of Appeals under-
lined that the authorization to appeal as "the owner of the ac-
count N[_] at Bank[..]" 65 represented a limited disguise
of the appellant's identity. In fact, the name of the owner of the
account was delivered to the Court in a sealed envelope. While
the name was not disclosed to the parties to the appeal, the
Court of Appeals reserved the right to open the envelope, at any
time, in case of opposition to the title of an account. Neverthe-
less, even during this verification process, the Court would not
have disclosed to the other parties the name of the account's
owner.
The Court of Appeals confirmed that the right to appeal
anonymously is necessary to protect the right of appeal. As
maintained by the Swiss Supreme Court, 16 6 the access to cer-
tain Information by the parties to a proceeding may be denied
in order to protect Bank secrecy. The issue to be resolved is
related to the prevailing interest based on the principle of pro-
portionality:1 67 on one hand the protection of secret Informa-
tion relating to the Bank customer; e.g. the identity of the
owner of a certain Bank account; on the other hand the right of
a participating party to know the identity of the appellant.
Considering that the owners of the accounts entered the appeal
162 Id.
163 Id. at 341.
164 CRP 20/12/91; CRP 3/7/89; CRP 21/6/88.
165 CRP 3/9/92, at Rep. 345 (1992).
166 BGE 951 439, 446-446.
167 BGE 95 I 103.
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to oppose the disclosure of certain secret Information, including
their identity, the Court of Appeals asked rhetorically: "[hiow
can one protect a secret if to do so he has to disclose it?"168 Ac-
cordingly, the right of the account owner to appeal the decrees,
without disclosing their identities, was protected.
Finally, among the preliminary issues examined by the
Court of Appeals, was the lack of explanation for the decrees
themselves. Considering that on one hand the obligation to pro-
vide the arguments supporting the decrees is mandated by
law16 9 and that on the other hand the explanation of the rea-
sons behind a decree is an absolute requirement for the exercise
of the right to appeal, 170 the Court of Appeals concluded that
while the decree of the Instruction Judge satisfied the minimum
requirements of the law, the decree of the Public Prosecutor,
which did not provide supporting arguments at all, was insuffi-
ciently motivated.17' Nevertheless, the Court affirmed previous
jurisprudence, whereby sufficient disclosure and argumentation
in the appeal process would remedy a lack of argumentation of
the decree appealed, 72 thus saving the formal validity of the
Public Prosecutor's decree.
2. On the Appeals Against the Decree of the Instruction
Judge.
The Instruction Judge issued his decree complying with the
request for judicial assistance received from the Italian authori-
ties. The law applicable to the judicial assistance between Italy
and Switzerland consists principally of the European Conven-
tion1 73 and, where the European Convention is silent, legal
grounds are provided by domestic laws on judicial assistance 74
which provide the limits and conditions for this assistance. 175
168 CRP 3/9/92, at Rep. 346 (1992).
169 Article 28 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
170 Article 4 of the Swiss Constitution and art. 13 of the European Convention
on Human Rights.
171 CRP 3/9/92, at Rep. 350 (1992).
172 BGE 117 lb 66.
173 The European Convention of April 20, 1959 on Judicial Assistance in Crim-
inal Matters has been ratified by both countries.
174 Federal Law of March 20, 1981 on Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters.
Since Conventions prevail over domestic regulations, this law is applicable only to
the extent it does not violate the letter and the spirit of the European Convention.
175 BGE 112 lb 576.
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For the Instruction Judge to decide on the acceptability of a
request for judicial assistance, it is necessary that the applica-
tion by the foreign authorities provides Information sufficient to
verify if the conditions for its acceptance are followed. 176 In
particular, the Instruction Judge should be able to verify the
punishability in Switzerland of the crime imputed by the for-
eign authority.177 This Information can be provided at different
stages prior to a formal decision by the Instruction Judge. The
Instruction Judge can also solicit clarifications and additional
details.'7 8 Considering that the mere legal qualification of a
crime is not sufficient to support a request for judicial assist-
ance, the Court of Appeals required a short description of the
facts imputed, to allow the exam of the application and the eval-
uation of the proportionality of the specific acts of assistance
requested.' 79 Accordingly, after examining the Information
available, the Court of Appeals suspended the execution of the
decree against 11 of the 44 individuals and assigned the Italian
authorities a 60 day period to complete the application with ad-
ditional Information.1 0
With regard to the issue of reciprocity,'"' Switzerland has
limited its assistance to the prosecution of such crimes whose
objective elements are subject to prosecution in Switzerland in
accord with its participation in the European Convention on ju-
dicial assistance.' 8 2 Confirming numerous precedents at the
national level, 8 3 the Court of Appeals held judicial assistance
admissible in connection with the prosecution of passive, as well
as active, corruption. 8 4
176 The Instruction Judge will base his decision for judicial assistance on the
description of the facts which suggest illegalities by the Italian Authorities. The
Instruction Judge's decision will be binding on the Italian Judge responsible for
the matter. BGE 109 lb 329. Accordingly, the Swiss Instruction Judge will at-
tempt to limit potential contradictions and substantial loopholes in Swiss law.
177 Except for military, political or tax crimes for which Switzerland does not
provide judicial assistance. See CRP 3/9/92, at Rep. 351 (1992).
178 DTF 106 Ia 264.
179 DTF 106 1b 264; 105 Ia 213; 99 Ia 78-79.
180 CRP 3/9/92, at Rep. 354 (1992).
1 See Reciprocity.. ., supra section VI, part A, sub. 4.
182 Article 64.1 of the Federal Law on Judicial Assistance In Criminal Matters.
183 BGE 115 lb 257; 113 Ib 257; 112 lb 576.
1s4 CRP 3/9/92, at Rep. 356 (1992).
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The Court of Appeals also examined the claim, raised by all
appellants, that the decree of the Instruction Judge consisted of
a "fishing expedition," e.g. a general and indiscriminate search
for evidence to substantiate a theory of crime for which no suffi-
cient elements are available.18 5 The claim was that instead of
targeting specific accounts, the decree covered all Banks for all
Banking relations of 44 persons during the last five years.'8 6
Noting that the extended search did not in itself constitute a
prohibited "fishing expedition," the Court of Appeals held that it
was necessary that substantial elements indicated that the in-
dividuals listed in the decree were involved in the crimes de-
scribed in the application, and that a reasonable suspicion
existed that such individuals had used Swiss Banks, where the
proceeds of the crimes may still be deposited.' 8 7
After examining all available Information, the Court of Ap-
peals came to the conclusion that a reasonable suspicion existed
for only 13 of the 44 individuals listed in the decree.' 88 For the
remaining persons, the Court held that the suspicions, if any,
were mere theories not supported by substantial elements. Ac-
cordingly, with regard to those remaining 31 individuals, the
application for judicial assistance from the Italian authorities
was held to be a "fishing expedition" and could therefore not be
executed by the Instruction Judge.
Finally, the Court of Appeals examined the claim and held
that if judicial assistance was granted, the Information trans-
mitted would be used to prosecute tangential crimes. The con-
dition that Information disclosed in connection with judicial
assistance was not to be used in other proceedings, was contem-
plated by Switzerland in the act of ratification of the European
Convention on Judicial Assistance in criminal matters. 18 9 Com-
pliance with this requirement by states who have signed the
European Convention can be presumed and the limits to the use
of the Information transmitted are to be clearly stated in the
transmission act.190 Furthermore, only documents clearly rele-
185 BGE 103 Ia 206.
186 CRP 3/9/92, at Rep. 338 (1992).
187 Id. at 357.
188 Id. at 359.
189 Id. at 362.
190 BGE 112 Th 590.
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vant for the specific procedure are to be transmitted' 91 and the
rights of privacy of unrelated third parties are to be pro-
tected. 192 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not share the
fear of abuse by the Italian authorities and rejected that claim
as reason invalidating the decree of the Instruction Judge. 193
The Court of Appeals concluded its exam by partially con-
firming the decree of the Instruction Judge against 13 of the 44
individuals under investigation and submitting the execution of
said decree against 17 other individuals to the condition of de-
livery by the Italian authorities of additional documentation
within a 60 day period. For the remaining 14 cases the appeal
was entirely admitted and the decree repealed.
3. On the Appeals Against the Decree of the Public
Prosecutor.
As indicated in the section on the facts leading to this judi-
cial case,194 the Public Prosecutor issued his decree in connec-
tion with his own investigation for crimes presumably
committed in Switzerland. The elements on which that inquiry
was based were all found in the Information included in the re-
quest for judicial assistance filed by the Italian authorities. Af-
ter examining that Information, the Court of Appeals concluded
that the elements offered were so vague and generic that the
decree appeared more as a "fishing expedition" for purposes to
assist the Italian authorities than a step necessary to support
reasonable suspicions of criminal activity in connection with the
prosecutorial investigation. 195 In particular, the Court held
that the effects and the potential damages of the Public Prose-
cutor's decree on the individuals concerned were dispropor-
tional and unjustified in consideration of the elements
supporting the suspicion of crimes committed in Switzerland.
Accordingly, while recognizing that the independent investiga-
tion of the Public Prosecutor could eventually justify the issu-
ance of a decree such as the one appealed, the Court held that at
that stage of the inquiry, and based on the Information and evi-
191 BGE 112 Tb 604.
192 Article 10.1 of the Federal Law on Judicial Assistance in Criminal Matters.
193 CRP 3/9/92, at Rep. 362 (1992).
194 See supra section VI, part B, sub. 1.
195 CRP 3/9/92, at Rep. 364-65 (1992).
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dence available at that point in time, the decree of the Public
Prosecutor lacked probable cause. 196
The requirement that probable cause support a disclosure
and seizure decree led the Court of Appeals to comment inciden-
tally on the issue of reciprocity 97 in connection with the crime
of money-laundering. Siding with one part of the doctrine on
the subject, 198 the Court of Appeals required as proof of the
crime of money-laundering' 99 that the money so "laundered"
originates from a criminal act, which is considered criminal, not
only pursuant to the legislation of the country where it has been
committed, but also in Switzerland. 200 In doing so, the Court of
Appeals required the application of the reciprocity standard not
only to the crime of money-laundering, but also to the crime
necessary to fulfill the crime of money-laundering. 20 1
With regard to the seizure ordered by the Public Prosecutor
pursuant to Article 58 of the Penal Code,20 2 the Court of Ap-
peals observed that such a measure was unnecessary, ex-
tremely difficult and of limited effect. 20 3 While admitting the
authority of the Public Prosecutor to order a seizure pursuant to
Article 58 of the Penal Code, the Court submitted the decision,
on the adoption of the order, to the principle of judicial effi-
ciency applicable to any public act performed under domestic
law. Based on that notion, the Public Prosecutor should have
withheld action, both because it was not clear that Switzerland
had jurisdiction on the matter and because the foreign courts
196 Id. at 366.
197 See Reciprocity, supra section VI, part A, sub. 4.
198 See 1 N. SCHMID, RiSTA i DinRiro AMMINISTRATIVO TICINESE 412-414
(1992).
199 Article 305 of the Swiss Penal Code.
200 The rationale behind this approach is that, under Swiss Law, confidential
Bank Information will not be ordered disclosed by the judiciary if the essential
element of the crime, e.g. money-laundering, was not deemed to be a crime under
Swiss Law. This approach is not shared by those scholars who separate the crime
of money-laundering from the act generating the money. The scholars supporting
this doctrine focus exclusively on the double punishability of the money-laundering
itself. See 8 PAOLO BERNASCON, SCHWEIZERISCHE ANwALTSVEREIN 13.
201 CRP 3/9/92, at Rep. 367 (1992).
202 Article 58.1 of the Penal Code allows seizure of the profits or other assets
derived from a criminal activity even if the owner cannot be prosecuted and pun-
ished for the crime. This may be the case when the owner is a resident of a foreign
country, not legally competent, dead or unknown.
203 CRP 3/9/92, at Rep. 370 (1992).
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were in a better position to ascertain the facts.204 Accordingly,
the seizure was not justified by domestic law pursuant to Arti-
cle 58 of the Penal Code and therefore any such measure was to
be reserved for the procedure of judicial assistance.
The Court of Appeals further examined the relation be-
tween the Italian investigation, which caused the request for
judicial assistance followed by the decree of the Instruction
Judge, and the independent investigation of the Public Prosecu-
tor.20 5 Certain appellants suggested that the decree of the
Swiss Prosecutor, which was based solely on the request for ju-
dicial assistance and was not supported by any independent act
of investigation, was in fact motivated by the desire of the Pub-
lic Prosecutor's to assist its Italian colleagues, rather than the
genuine need for discovery to support the Swiss investigation.
Noting that it was not opposed to cooperation between the
Swiss and the Italian authorities, the Court of Appeals held
that such cooperation is illegal when it intends to by-pass, or
has the effect of by-passing, principles regulating judicial assist-
ance between states as well as the legitimate interests in pro-
tecting private or national interests. 20 6
The Court further observed that because the Public Prose-
cutor was not part of the judicial assistance proceeding, this did
not preclude him from accessing the Information acquired
thereby.207 Therefore, despite not being permitted to issue his
own decree, the Public Prosecutor still maintained the option of
beginning or sustaining an independent investigation based on
the findings of the Instruction Judge.208 Finally, the Court of
Appeals found that the Public Prosecutor's decree also lacked
the legal requirement of urgency since, on the one hand, he had
access to the Information acquired by the Instruction Judge
and, on the other hand, the seizure was accomplished in connec-
tion with the judicial assistance proceeding.
204 In those cases the prosecution of the crime and the seizure proceeding
should be left with the authorities of the countries requesting assistance. See BGE
115 Ib 538.
205 CRP 3/9/92, at Rep. 371 (1992).
206 See CRP 3/9/92, at Rep. 334-72 (1992). This comment of the Court of Ap-
peals was inexplicably not published in the reported decision.
207 Article 142.2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of the Canton of Ticino.
20W CRP 3/9/92, at Rep. 371 (1992).
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Accordingly, the Court of Appeals repealed the decree of the
Public Prosecutor which ordered the disclosure of Information
and seizure of the assets related to the accounts owned by the
individuals subject to investigation of the Italian authorities.
D. The Decisions of the Swiss Supreme Court
The Swiss Supreme Court was first called upon to rule on
this matter by an appeal of some of the individuals who were
objects of the decree of the Instruction Judge20 9 and later by an
appeal by the City of Milan,210 both against the decision of the
Court of Appeals in connection with the decree of the Instruc-
tion Judge. The portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals
repealing the decree of the Public Prosecutor was not opposed
by any of the parties involved.
The first appeal claimed that the Court of Appeals had mis-
takenly admitted compliance with the requirement of reciproc-
ity 2 11 for lack of punishability in Switzerland of the crime of
corruption. The reasoning of the appellants rested on the as-
sumption that Swiss law punishes as the act of corrupting
Swiss but not Italian civil servants. Since the Italian authori-
ties had requested the assistance of the Swiss authorities in
connection with their investigation into the corruption of Italian
public employees, the appellant concluded that the requirement
of reciprocity was not complied with and therefore no judicial
assistance could be granted. The Supreme Court dismissed this
reasoning indicating that the exam of reciprocity of the punish-
ability of the crime required transposition of the events.2 1 2 The
acts attributed to the person under investigation, for purposes
of the reciprocity requirement, had to be considered as if they
were performed in Switzerland or under Swiss jurisdiction. 213
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held the act of corruption must
be considered committed in Switzerland and the public em-
ployee corrupted was assumed to be serving as a Swiss author-
ity.214 The appeal was therefore dismissed.
209 Sentence 29/3/93, at Rep. 142-47 (1993), partially published.
210 Sentence 1A. 21111992 of June 29, 1993 of the Swiss Supreme Court,
unpublished.
211 See Reciprocity, supra section VI, part A, sub. 4.
212 CRP 3/9/92, at Rep. 145 (1992).
213 See also ScHuLTz, DAS SCHWEIZERISCHE AUSLIEFERUNGSRECHT 327 (1953).
214 CRP 3/9/92, at Rep. 145 (1992).
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The Swiss Supreme Court was later called again to decide
on the portion of the sentence of the Court of Appeals concern-
ing the decree of the Instruction Judge by an appeal of the City
of Milan. Reconfirming the sentence appealed, the Supreme
Court held that the Banks were correct to appeal since they
were requested to disclose Information protected by the Duty of
Confidentiality. 215 The Supreme Court also confirmed the re-
quirement that sufficient explanation be included in the de-
mand of judicial assistance filed by a foreign authority so as to
allow the Instruction Judge to verify the existence of objective
elements relating the person investigated to the crime asserted,
as well as tracing the money to Swiss Bank accounts.2 16 The
Court held that requiring the Instruction Judge to begin indis-
criminate searches to find the elements supporting the request
of the Italian authorities would have violated the principle of
proportionality and exceeded any reasonable requirement of the
international judicial assistance. 217 The Supreme Court did not
accept any of the other reasoning offered by the City of Milan in
its appeal. Accordingly, the sentence of the Court of Appeals of
the Canton of Ticino was held to conform to all applicable
law.218
CONCLUSION
Over the past two decades the Duty of Confidentiality of
Banks has endured both foreign and domestic attacks. Interna-
tional treaties and conventions have reduced possible abuses,
strengthening the credibility of the system. Having learned
from the mistakes of the 1970's and 1980's, Swiss Banks have
developed a system of internal controls and regulation that al-
lows them to prevent, among others, the abuse of Bank secrecy
215 Thus, the precedent held by the Supreme Court was confirmed. See BGE
118 lb 444.
216 Supra note 210, at 7.
217 Supra note 210, at 7-8.
218 The Supreme Court did not issue a decision on the appeal but simply con-
cluded that no legal interest in the matter existed since, the persons for which
judicial assistance had been suspended or denied, either the City of Milan had
obtained the disclosure in later proceedings or it had withdrawn the request for
assistance. Despite finding the issue moot, the Supreme Court discussed the mat-
ter summarily in order to decide, for purposes of refund of legal and judicial costs
and fees, which party would have won and which party would have lost the appeal.
See supra note 210, at 4.
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for criminal purposes, particularly by organized crime. At the
same time, the legitimate purposes that Bank secrecy is in-
tended to serve have been reaffirmed at the political as well as
judicial levels. Specifically, principles upon which Bank secrecy
rests have been confirmed and have remained untouched by the
decisions of the Court of Appeals of the Canton of Ticino and the
Swiss Supreme Court. Therefore, the Duty of Confidentiality of
Banks has remained intact and the respectability and strength
of the Swiss Banking system has been enhanced.
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